



DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 














Department of Economics 
Kenneth Taylor Hall 426 
1280 Main Street West 




The Impact of Lifecycle Events on Women’s Labour Force Transition: 




Department of Economics, McMaster University 
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research,  







This panel study explores the impact of different lifecycle events on women's labour force transitions.  
Whether the factors that determine entry into the labour force differ from the factors that determine 
withdrawal from the labour force is explicitly investigated. The results demonstrate that labour force 
transitions – entry and withdrawal – occur more frequently among young women. The event of childbirth is 
strongly associated with labour force withdrawal, while marital separation and reductions in family 
earnings are strongly associated with labour force entry. Moreover, labour force transition probabilities are 
more sensitive to income-reducing events than to income-supplementing events. 
 
JEL classifications: J12; J13; J21  




                                                 
∗  Correspondence: Sung-Hee Jeon, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The 
University of Melbourne, Tel: 61-3-83442191, Email:shjeon@unimelb.edu.au    
1. Introduction 
In this paper women’s labour force transitions and their association with ‘trigger events’ 
over their lifecycle are examined. Included is an explicit investigation of both aspects of women’s 
labour force transitions: labour force entry and withdrawal.  The factors which determine entry to 
and exit from the labour force are assessed. 
            In Canada, during the 1970’s and 1980’s, the labour market participation of women grew 
steadily from less than 50% up to 70%; throughout the 1990’s it remained at around 75%. This is 
lower than the relevant male participation rates (Beaudry and Lemieux 1999; Chaykowski and 
Powell 1999). The labour force participation rates of Canadian women and men in the 1990’s, by 
age group, are given in table A.1. The average labour force participation rate of prime-age men is 
over 90% while the average labour force participation rate of prime-age women is consistently 
less than 80%. This leads us to question whether the women’s labour market participation rate has 
reached a long-run steady-state level. If the labour force participation rate is constant at the long-
run steady-state level in each period, the labour force participation rate equals the labour force 
entry rate divided by the total labour force transition rate, which is the sum of the labour force 
entry and withdrawal rates. An explanation of female participation needs to relate their lifecycle 
behaviour to labour force transition.
1  
This study explicitly investigates some dynamics of women’s labour market 
participation, labour force entry and withdrawal, and the association of those transitions with 
lifecycle events. The results provide a complementary summary of the degree to which transitions 
are associated with particular events.  
                                                 
1 LFRt = (1-LWRt) * LFRt-1 + LERt * (1- LFRt-1), where LFR is calculated as number of women in labour 
force in period t divided by the population of women over 19 years old in period t (a state probability), 
LWR is calculated as the number of women withdrawn from labour force in period t divided by the number 
of women in the labour force in period t-1, and LER is calculated as the number of women entered into the 
labour force in period t divided by the number of women not in the labour force in period t-1.  NLFR (1- 
LFR) is the number of women not in the labour force in period t / population of women over 19 years old in 
period t. If LFRt =LFRt-1 then LFRt= LERt / (LERt +LWRt) 
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Women’s labour market participation is particularly interesting, because their lifecycle 
events are different to those of men. Obviously, giving birth is unique to women; childcare and 
housework are still more likely to be perceived as women’s work within the family. A US study 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000) shows that when men do all the market work, they contribute on 
average about 10% of house work, but as their share of outside work falls, their share of 
housework rises to no more than 37%.
2 An identity model of behaviour illustrates how the 
identity of ‘woman’ influences the decision to participate in the labour market (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000). Gender is not an identity solely of choice; it is an assigned identity which is 
associated with different ideal physical attributes and prescribed social behaviour. The identity 
model shows that if women’s identity is enhanced by work at home, they will have weaker labour 
force attachment than do men. 
Considering the more traditional (neoclassical) model of female labour supply, the wife’s 
labour supply is commonly defined as conditional on the husband's income. Consequently in this 
model, a married woman conditions her labour supply on her husband’s labour supply decision. 
This makes the wife the secondary earner in the household.  Thus, a woman’s labour force 
participation is more elastic, with respect to changes in wage and non-labour income and other 
fixed costs, than is that of the primary male earner. Although it is an inconclusive argument that 
women would be treated as secondary earners in families,
3 it is observable that women’s labour 
force transitions generally occur more frequently than those of men. One example would be 
women’s labour force transition associated with childbearing and childcare. A woman who once 
                                                 
2 According to the specialization hypothesis (Becker 1965), there will be a negative monotonic relationship 
between the share of home work done by one partner and that same partner’s share of market work.  
3  Mroz (1987) undertakes an exogeneity test for non-wife’s income variables, and he finds that it could not 
be rejected at reasonable levels of significance. On the other hand, Hausman and Ruud (1984) suggest that 
the joint labour supply model (family labour supply model) in which the family utility function is 
maximized subject to a family budget constraint could not be rejected. Aronsson (1994) also tests the 
hypothesis, using Swedish data, that the husband's hours of work are weakly separable, both from the wife's 
hours of work and from household consumption. The hypothesis of weak separability is rejected in his 
study 
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withdrew from the labour force because of caring for children may re-enter after her children 
have grown up.  
In the first part of this study, the probability of entry and withdrawal from the labour 
force conditional on experiencing trigger events such as marriage, divorce, childbirth, and the 
financial consequences of changes in the employment status of other household members is 
estimated. In the process, we estimate 1) unconditional probabilities of entry and withdrawal from 
the labour force, 2) unconditional probabilities of each trigger event, 3) probabilities of labour 
force transitions conditional on lifecycle events and 4) probabilities of lifecycle events 
conditional on labour force transitions. Such statistics give us a descriptive measure of the 
relative importance of various lifecycle events in labour force transitions. They can be used to 
construct a (descriptive) decomposition of the fraction of all transitions that is accounted for by 
each of the different lifecycle events. This methodology is adopted from Jenkins and Schluter 
(2003).
4 The analysis is extended by estimating random effects panel probit models of labour 
force transitions with a set of control variables including trigger events, age, regional dummies, 
educational dummies and a correction term for sample selection bias. A two-step sample selection 
correction method is employed for a dynamic panel data model with a binary outcome, as 
suggested by Orme (1997).
5   
  The study results show that the event of childbirth is strongly associated with labour force 
withdrawal, while marital separation and decreases in family earnings are strongly associated 
with labour force entry. In addition, labour force transition probabilities are more sensitive to 
income-reducing events than to income-supplementing events. Assessing the importance of 
various events as root causes of transitions may have important policy applications. Recognizing 
                                                 
4 Jenkins and Schluter (2003) examine whether cross-national differences in child poverty and entry and 
exit rates arise from cross-national differences in the prevalence of trigger events experienced by 
households and household members, or by cross-national differences in entry and exit probabilities 
conditional on experiencing those trigger events. 
5 The approach here is similar to Bruce (2000) who uses a transition probit and Orme’s sample selection 
correction to analyze the self-employment transitions. 
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the relevance of the dynamic dimension to explanations of labour force participation has 
implications for policy making related to women’s labour market participation.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes what we know about women’s 
labour market participation in relation to lifecycle events, and it discusses a potential pitfall in the 
interpretation of findings from common empirical models. Section 3 describes the data, with 
explanations of the key definitions that are the basis of this exploratory analysis.  Section 4 
examines trigger events and labour force transitions with three types of statistics. Section 5 
presents the multivariate methods and reports the estimation results. Section 6 contains 
concluding remarks.  
2. Empirical literature on women’s labour market participation and a potential pitfall in 
the interpretation of findings 
It is not surprising that the effects of childbearing and childcare on women’s labour 
market activities have received a lot of attention from researchers. Nakamura and Nakamura 
(1992), Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1998), and Barrow (1999) report significant negative 
consequences of childcare on women’s labour force participation. Yet Gunderson (1998) has 
shown that the magnitude of the negative effect of childcare on women’s labour supply has 
declined over time. Carrasco (2001), Chun and Oh (2002) and Francesconi (2002) find strong 
negative effects from fertility for women’s labour force participation. Dex et al. (1998) and 
Gutierrez-Domenech (2005) find that after giving birth, education is an important factor for the 
continuity of employment. Regardless of the countries studied, childbearing/caring has a negative 
impact on women’s labour market attachment. In particular, empirical evidence shows that 
changing work patterns surrounding the birth of children (especially first births) provide crucial 
information on individual heterogeneity of the preference for work.  Some studies demonstrate 
that women who return to work shortly after the birth of a first child are considerably more likely 
to be persistent workers throughout their lives (Mott and Shapiro 1983; Shapiro and Mott 1994). 
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In this study, labour force withdrawals associated with child birth and care are examined, but also 
labour force entries associated with becoming free from childcare. This paper also contributes to 
the findings on exits by accessing the relative importance of childbearing/caring compared to 
other events.  
The effect of marital status on women’s labour supply is another strand of research. 
Johnson and Skinner (1986; 1988) are interested in the effect of divorce on women’s labour 
supply. They find that women’s labour supply is positively associated with divorce. Johnson and 
Skinner (1986) suggest that women who subsequently divorce increase their labour supply and 
labour force participation in the three years prior to separation. In their later study, Johnson and 
Skinner (1988) examine the correlation between increased labour supply among separated women 
and changes in observable characteristics (for example, fall in family income and the rise in the 
woman’s after-tax wage rate). They address the problem that unobservable factors related to 
marital status are also important determinants of the change in women’s labour force 
participation. In addition, Nakamura and Nakamura (1996) study the dynamics of women’s 
labour supply using US panel data from the 1969 to 1979 waves of the Michigan Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). Although it provides a descriptive analysis of the dynamics of labour 
supply, they find significant impacts from divorce and childbirth on women’s labour supply, not 
only in the event year but also in the year prior to it.
 6 Here, the impact of marriage and separation 
on women’s labour force transitions is studied taking into account the financial consequences of 
these events.  
As an empirical strategy, probit (or logit) models for a binary outcome are generally used 
by researchers to estimated women’s labour market participation, conditional on women’s 
                                                 
6 Nakamura and Nakamura (1996) estimate probit equations for the probability that women start work in 
year t, and for the probability that women continue to work in year t, using two sub-samples, which include 
all women who did not work in year t-1 and all women who worked in t-1 respectively. In addition, they 
estimate equations for the annual hours of work in year t using two sub-groups of women who did not work 
in t-1 but who worked in year t and women who worked in t-1 and also in t respectively. They also examine 
the effect of expected events on women’s labour supply decisions by defining events over three years t-1, t 
and t+1. 
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characteristics such as marital status, children, education, and family income. However, using 
such models systematically imposes that labour force entry and withdrawal (which are responses 
to changes in wages, income and fixed costs) are symmetric responses.  Suppose Yt and Yt-1 are 
(time) independent, where Y is a binary outcome and a function of Xs, then the marginal effects of 
a change in X on the binary outcome of Y are symmetric.
7 The systematic symmetry occurs not 
only with the probit model. It is imposed with other static state models: Yt = f(Xt) like the logit and 
linear probability models.  Most studies simply focus on one side of labour force responses (in 
most cases labour force participation or entry). However, they implicitly (or explicitly) regard the 
labour force response to changes in wages, income and fixed costs as symmetrical. This creates a 
potential pitfall in the interpretation of the existing empirical literature. For instance, the 
magnitude of the marginal effect of a decrease in family income on labour force entry is assumed 
equal to the magnitude of the marginal effect of an increase in family income on labour force 
withdrawal. In the panel perspective, this study explicitly investigates whether the factors which 
determine entry into the labour force differ from the factors which determine withdrawal from the 
labour force. This approach also allows us to identify asymmetries in women’s labour force entry 
and withdrawal responses to changes in lifecycle events. 
3. Data and definitions  
Data are used from survey reference years 1993 to 2000 of the Canadian Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). The SLID is a longitudinal survey with a rotating panel 
structure. The first wave of the first panel was in 1993. The original sample of respondents was 
followed and interviewed at one-year intervals for the next six years. The second six-year panel 
                                                 
7 If Yt and Yt-1 are independent, where Y is labour force participation status, Pr(labour force entry) = 
Pr(Yt=1| Yt-1=0) = Pr(Yt=1| Yt-1=1) = Pr(Yt=1) and Pr(labour force withdrawal) = Pr(Yt=0| Yt-1=1) = 
Pr(Yt=0| Yt-1=0) = Pr(Yt=0) = 1- Pr(Yt=1). For the probit model, where Ф(·) is a standard normal 
cumulative distribution function, Pr( 1) ( ) YX β = =Φ  andPr( 0) 1 ( ) YX β = =− Φ . The marginal effect of 
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began in 1996. Each wave comprises two separate interviews. One is a labour interview in 
January; the other is an income interview in May.
8 For both interviews, the reference year is the 
previous calendar year. There are two reasons to use SLID for this study. First this panel study of 
female labour supply in Canada fills a gap in the literature. Second, from an international 
perspective the SLID data have some unique attractive features.  SLID has more accurate income 
data compared with the self-reported (surveyed) income data of other panel studies. There are two 
potential sources of income data for SLID: respondents can either report income sources during 
the interview or grant permission to Statistics Canada to obtain their tax file data from Revenue 
Canada for the purpose of the survey. In effect, well over half of SLID’s income data comes 
directly from Revenue Canada (63% in 1994 and over 80% in 2000). In addition, SLID provides 
clear information regarding marital status, and the child’s relationship to the woman. The ‘marital 
status’ variable includes seven coding categories: married (legal marriage), common-law, 
separated, divorced, widowed, single (never married) and separated common-law. Own birth 
children can be separated from step, adopted and foster children. Accurate income and 
demographic information is critical in reducing measurement errors in estimates of labour force 
transition rates, especially when investigating asymmetric responses to changes in income and 
other demographic variables.  
The sample panel for analysis includes 14598
9 women aged 19 to 65:  7025 from the first 
SLID panel (1993 to 1998), and 7573 from the second SLID panel (1996 to 2000). For the 
descriptive analysis that follows, the data are pooled from all eight years. Because the events of 
interest are infrequent, pooling the data from different years is necessary to give reliable results. 
The women are grouped into four age categories based on their ages in each year: 19 to 30, 31 to 
                                                 
8  From 2005, the ‘income’ and ‘labour’ interviews were combined into a single interview each January. 
9 Since only one-third of all women in the unbalanced panel are present for all survey years, and labour 
force transitions have been defined on the basis of two consecutive waves, this reduces the size of the 
sample further. The balanced sample panel (in which there is no missing information through all sample 
data years) includes 14598 different women. 
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40, 41 to 50 and 51 to 65. This is because the incidence of lifecycle events associated with labour 
force transitions varies significantly with age.  
Definitions of labour force transitions and trigger events are based on the same two 
consecutive years.  A woman’s labour force transition is an entry if she is a participant in period t 
conditional on being a non-participant in the previous period t-1. Conversely, a woman’s labour 
force transition is a withdrawal if she is a non-participant in period t conditional on being a 
participant in the previous period t-1. SLID has a variable for annual labour force status, but the 
coding of the variables makes it difficult to identify an individual’s labour force status. Labour 
force transitions are therefore defined on the basis of changes in monthly labour force status for 
September of each year. Labour force transition rates are calculated using the labour force status 
for March to check for significant differences from those calculated using September data. No 
significant difference is shown.   Labour force transition rates in September are given in table 2, 
and those in March are given in appendix table A.2.   
First consider demographic events associated with women’s labour force transitions. 
Demographic trigger events related to labour force withdrawal are marriage, childbirth, and 
childcare for pre-school children. Demographic trigger events related to labour force entry are 
divorce (separation, or loss of spouse) and absence of responsibility for children. Applying the 
same rule, trigger events are defined on the basis of changes between two consecutive survey 
reference years. For example, a woman is counted as newly married, including common-law 
relationships, if her marital status changed from single to married between two years. Some 
‘lifecycle event’ derived variables provided by Statistics Canada are utilized.  For example, there 
is a family life event flag indicating whether a person became a birth parent during the survey 
reference year.
10 Also, childbirth is separated from other reasons for living with children in each 
reference year (for example, step, adopted and foster). In addition, changes in the composition of 
a household because of marriage or separation may also have important financial consequences 
                                                 
10 There is also a variable indicating the occurrence of the first child’s birth. 
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for women.  A woman may have access to a higher income via income-sharing with a working 
partner because of (re)marriage. Divorce, separation or death may result in the loss of a spouse’s 
income. We attempt to decompose the effect on labour force transitions of marriage and divorce 
into the impact of the trigger event itself and the impact of its financial consequences.   
Another key class of trigger events can be summarized as changes in the financial 
conditions of the family. Women’s labour force transitions are precipitated by events such as 
changes in family members’ labour market attachment, or changes in family earnings. Women’s 
labour supply, known as the added worker effect, may be an important aspect of the household 
consumption-smoothing response to their husband’s job displacement (Stephens 2002; Seitchik 
1991).  Examples of income-supplementing events include an unemployed spouse or any other 
family member getting a job, and an already-employed spouse or any other member’s increasing 
labour earnings (for example, a change in job, promotion, or working longer hours) or other 
income. On the other hand, examples of income-reducing events include job loss by an employed 
spouse or any other family member, and a decrease in the earnings of spouses or of other family 
members.
11  
It is quite difficult to define reliably other family members’ labour market activity in the 
data.  Therefore, we define two different trigger events, relating to changes in earnings (and 
income) of other family members, as proxies indicating the occurrence of financial events in a 
woman’s life time.  First, we compute other family members’ earnings by subtracting the 
woman’s earnings from the total earnings of the family; then the event is counted when other 
family earnings increase or decrease by 20% or more between two consecutive years. The 
threshold of 20% is chosen to ensure that transitory earnings variations are not counted as events. 
These changes in family earnings, however, may also correspond to changes in the number of 
earners in the family. To separate out the effect of those changes, it might be desirable to have 
                                                 
11 Also we can think of special needs for family expenditure such as buying a house (paying a mortgage), a 
car or any other durable goods (see for example, Fortin, 1995). 
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more disaggregated measures of the financial events affecting these households. Here, an event of 
‘pure earnings changes’ is defined to denote changes in family earnings that occur without an 
increase or decrease in the number of earners, not including the woman, in the family. 
4. Trigger events and labour force transitions  
Suppose that there is a set of mutually exclusive trigger events j=1,…, J, and that all 
labour force withdrawal decisions occur because of one such event.  







Then, among those women with a chance of withdrawal from the labour force between one year 
and the next, the proportion who withdraw is indicated by the sum of the proportions of women 
who withdraw in association with each of the different events.  







By the rules of joint probability, each term on the right-hand side can be rewritten as the product 
of the probability of withdrawal, conditional on event occurrence, and the probability of each 
event. 
Similarly, the probability that women with a likelihood of entry will enter the labour 
force because of a set of mutually exclusive trigger events k=1,…,K can be related to the 
probabilities of each event and the probability of labour force entry, conditional on event 
occurrence: 







In this approach, we would also consider the potentialities for a labour force transition associated 
with each event for the average woman. The relative importance of events is then summarized 
directly by considering the fraction of all transitions that are accounted for by each of the 
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different events: pr(event j | withdrawal) for each event j, and pr (event k | entry) for each event k. 
Using Bayes’ Rule, these statistics are related to each other by: 








        pr (event j | labour force withdrawal) = 
  pr (labour force withdrawal | event j) * pr (event j) / pr (labour force withdrawal)  
for labour force withdrawal, and 








         pr (event k | labour force entry) = 
  pr (labour force entry | event k) * pr (event k) / pr (labour force entry) 
for labour force entry. 
In the next subsection, labour force transition rates are examined using three types of 
statistics: first, the prevalence of each trigger event: pr(event); second, the probability of labour 
force transitions conditional on experiencing such events: pr(labour force transition | event); and 
finally, the fraction of all transitions
12 accounted for by each event: pr(event | labour force 
transition). The focus is on the short-term effects of these events on labour force transitions; both 
are measured over an interval of one year.  
Before exploring labour force transition rates, we review the differences between state 
probabilities and transition probabilities. Figure 1 shows labour force participation rates of 
women by survey year, and table 1 shows labour force participation rates by age and 
demographic characteristics. Over the eight years captured by SLID, there is no significant 
change in Canadian women’s labour force participation rates. The rate is very stable at around 
                                                 
12 I focus on the subset of events most likely to be important. 
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74%.
13 All the age groups shown in table 1, except the oldest group, have a labour force 
participation rate 3 to 7 percentage points above the average rate for all women.
 14 The 
participation rate of the oldest group is much lower at 51%. Looking at the marital status of 
women, there is no dramatic difference in labour force participation between single women and 
married women. The difference is about 3 percentage points in the 19-30 and 41-50 age groups. 
On the other hand, across all age groups, differences in labour force participation rates between 
women living with and without pre-school children are more substantial than differences in the 
participation rates by marital status. In the first three age groups the differences in labour force 
participation rates between those living with and without pre-school children are between 7 and 
14 percentage points. Thus, the data confirm well-known cross-sectional patterns that the 
presence of pre-school children is associated with a significantly reduced probability of labour 
force participation. Next, we turn to an analysis of labour force transitions (rather than state 
probabilities), which exploits the panel nature of the data. 
4.1. Labour force transitions and the prevalence of trigger events by age group 
Table 2 shows the annual rates of labour force entry and withdrawal for women broken 
down by age group.  For all women, the average entry rate is 18.1% and the average withdrawal 
rate is 6.6%.
15 Transition rates are substantially different across age groups, and this supports a 
separate examination of labour force transitions and trigger events in each age group. Women 
aged between 19 and 30 have higher rates of both labour force entry and withdrawal than the rest 
of the sample. The entry rate is 19.8 percentage points higher than the average entry rate for all 
women, and the withdrawal rate is 2.6 percentage points higher than the average withdrawal rate 
for all women.   
                                                 
13 This figure is quite close to the labour force participation rates derived from the Labour Force Survey and 
presented in table A.1 in the appendix.  
14 It is not possible to distinguish cohort effects from age effects with this short panel.   
15 The computed labour force participation rate (on page 1, footnote1) using labour force transition rates:   
0.181/(0.181+0.066) =0.733 is very close to the actual labour force participation rates in table 1.  
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Table 3 exhibits prevalence of each trigger event in the analysis by age group. Being 
newly married, newly living with pre-school children
16 and giving birth are first considered as 
demographic events associated with labour force withdrawal. The incidence of these events falls 
with age. Regarding demographic events associated with labour force entry, women aged 19 to 30 
have the greatest likelihood of becoming separated from their partner, while women aged 31 to 40 
are the most likely to become free from the care of pre-school children. As discussed in section 3, 
changes in overall family earnings and income, and changes in family earnings and income 
without changes in the number of earners, are considered as financial events associated with 
labour force transition. For the prevalence of ‘pure’ increases or overall increases in family 
earnings and income, there are no notable differences across age groups except for a slight 
decrease in the oldest age group. The incidence of both ‘pure’ decreases and overall decreases in 
family members’ income and earnings is slightly higher in the youngest and oldest age groups 
relative to the middle age groups. Over all age groups, family earnings are increased without 
changes in the number of earners rather than by adding earners in the family. Roughly half of the 
incidence in falling family earnings is because of losing earners in the family.  
4.2. Trigger events and their association with the labour force transitions of women 
Table 4 reports the estimated probabilities of labour force transitions conditional on 
having experienced each trigger event. Regarding labour force withdrawal, the probabilities 
associated with childbirth or recently living with pre-school children are relatively large for the 
age groups 19 to 30 and 31 to 40.
17 Marriage is actually associated with a reduced probability of 
labour force withdrawal in the age group 19 to 30. The probability of withdrawal conditional on 
‘newly married’ (6.9%) is significantly smaller than the unconditional probability of withdrawal 
(9.2%). The financial events of increases in pure family earnings do not raise or lower the 
                                                 
16 This indicates that the person is newly living with one or more of her pre-school aged children (first child 
birth, step, adopted, foster) (pre-school aged = 0 to 5) as of December 31 of the reference year. 
17 The estimates of the other age groups cannot be released because of the small number of observations.   
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probability of labour force withdrawal. Yet financial changes, either with or without an increase 
in the number of earners in the family, have a more significant impact on the labour force 
withdrawal of women than the event of recent marriage for the age group 19 to 30. The 
probability of withdrawal associated with pure total income increase (10.9%) is greater than the 
probability of withdrawal associated with the experience of recent marriage (6.9%).  
Turning to labour force entry, among women within the age group 19 to 30 experiencing 
a new separation 38.6% entered the labour force; among women in the age group 31 to 40 
experiencing the same event, 42.6% entered the labour force. Marital separation is significantly 
associated with an increased probability of labour force withdrawal in the age group 31 to 40.  
For other events, about one-third of women aged 19 to 40 experiencing the event of being free 
from the childcare of pre-school children enter the labour force. Decreases in family earnings are 
associated with a high likelihood of entry into the labour force for all age groups. Particularly in 
the middle age group, the probabilities of entry conditional on having experienced a recent 
separation are larger than the probabilities of entry conditional on any other events.  Moreover, 
the event of a new separation itself, not the financial consequences of the event, is relatively more 
important regarding a woman’s decision to enter the labour force. For the age group 31 to 40, 
although both events of separation and family pure earning (total income) decreases are 
significantly associated with an increased probability of labour force entry, the marginal effect of 
being newly separated on labour force entry is 15%. On the other hand, the marginal effect of 
family pure earning decreases on labour force entry is 8%.
18   
As pointed out earlier, the factors that determine withdrawal from the labour force may 
differ from the factors that determine entry. Overall, the estimates reported in table 4 show that 
the effect of changes in family earnings on women’s labour force participation decisions is not 
                                                 
18 The marginal effects of event (X) on labour force entry (E) can be calculated by 
. This equals  Pr( | 1) Pr( | 0) EX EX =− = []
1
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symmetric. Women’s labour force participation decisions are more sensitive to income-reducing 
events than to income-supplementing ones. For example, over 30% of women within the age 
groups 19 to 30 and 31 to 40 who experience a decrease in family earnings enter the labour force, 
while less than 10% of women experiencing an increase in family earnings withdraw from the 
labour force. It implies that we need to be careful in interpreting estimates from conventional 
methods on labour force participation (for example probit and logit).  Asymmetry is more 
dramatic when comparing the probability of labour force withdrawal conditional on the event of 
becoming newly married, with the probability of labour force entry conditional on the event of 
becoming newly separated (7% compared to 39% among women aged 19 to 30, and 6% 
compared to 43% among women aged 31 to 40). The event of a new separation has a much larger 
impact on the labour supply decision of women than the event of becoming newly married. 
Separation is actually associated with an increased probability of labour force entry in all age 
groups, while being newly married is significantly associated with a reduced probability of labour 
force withdrawal in the age group of 19 to 30. 
To check the robustness of these results, the transition analysis is extended by defining 
labour force transitions on the basis of changes in labour force status between years t-1 and t+1 
conditional on experiencing an event between years t-1 and t. The results of this extension, 
presented in the appendix in tables A.3.a and A.3.b, show a very similar pattern to the results 
presented above. Most probabilities are somewhat higher. Only the probability of withdrawal 
associated with childbirth is slightly lower. This result also supports the findings of Mott and 
Shapiro (1983) and Shapiro and Mott (1994) which demonstrate that more persistent workers are 
more likely to return to work shortly after giving birth. 
Lastly, table 5 reports the incidences of events conditional on labour force transitions. It 
is interesting that a large fraction (more than 60%) of all labour force entries are not associated 
with any of the events considered in this study: labour force entries may occur for a rather more 
diverse set of reasons than were considered.  Across all age groups, the largest share of all entries 
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is associated with a decrease in family earnings. In addition, consideration of the proportion of all 
labour force withdrawals accounted for by each event suggests that the main reasons for 
withdrawal from the labour force are less diverse than the reasons for labour force entry noted in 
table 5. The events of childbirth and family earnings increases associated with labour withdrawal 
represent relatively large fractions (22.8% and 26.6%) of the total number of labour force 
withdrawals in the youngest age group. On the other hand, for the rest of the age groups, 
increases in other family earnings (for example job gains) account for a large share of all labour 
force withdrawals. About 23.8%, 22.1% and 15.3% of labour withdrawals in the age groups 31 to 
40, 41 to 50 and 51 to 65, respectively, are associated with increases in other family members’ 
earnings. 
5. Multivariate analysis of labour force transitions 
The analysis is extended by estimating a random effects probit model of women’s labour 
force transitions with a set of control variables including trigger events, age, regional dummies, 
educational dummies, and a correction term for sample selection bias. 
The main assumption of the random effects probit model is  
  (1 | , )( it it i it i Py X X ) ν βν == Φ + ,  t=1,…,T (4.1.1) 
and  
2 |~ ( 0 , ii v XN o r m a l ) ν σ  
where,  i ν is the unobserved individual effects;  i ν and  i X ( it X for all t) are independent and  i ν has 
a normal distribution. Since the variance of the latent variable model is unity, the relative 










, which is the proportion of the 
total variance contributed by the panel level variance component. These statistics lead to a simple 
test for the presence of the unobserved effects: the likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis 
that 0 ρ = . When ρ  is zero, the panel level variance component is unimportant and the panel 
estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.  
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We turn now to a potential source of bias resulting from a problem with sample selection. 
In estimating the determinants of labour force withdrawal or entry, the group of women who have 
a possibility of withdrawing from the labour force, or who have a possibility of entering the 
labour force, is a non-randomly selected sample. On average, women in the risk set of labour 
force withdrawal have higher labour force participation rates, and women in the risk set of labour 
force entry have lower labour force participation rates. This initial labour force state is likely to 
be correlated with unobserved individual characteristics. To correct for such sample selection 
bias, we follow the method suggested by Orme (1997). First, an initial stage probit is estimated,
19 
which is a probit regression for labour force participation in the year the individuals are first 
observed.
20 Then, a generalized residual ( ,0 ˆi υ ) is calculated from the initial stage probit and this 
is included as a regressor in the transition probit regressions. To summarize, labour force 
transitions (LFT) between two consecutive years, t-1 and t, are modelled using a random effects 
panel probit with specification: 
*' '
















 (labour force transition: withdrawal or entry) is a latent variable that equals one if 
individual ichanges labour force status at time t, Ei,t are trigger events
*
, it LFT
21 between two consecutive 
years, t-1 and t, and Xi,t are demographic variables including age, age squared, regional dummies, 
level of education dummies, a current student dummy and a panel dummy.  ,0 ˆi υ is  the generalized 
                                                 
19 In the initial stage probit, the right hand side variables include age, age squared, other family members’ 
total earnings, a dummy for living with spouse, a dummy for living with pre-school children, regional 
dummies, level of education dummies, a current student dummy and a panel dummy. 
20 SLID is individual level longitudinal data and two panels are used (the first panel is from 1993 to 1998, 
the second panel is from 1996 to 2001); therefore, the first observed year is either 1993 or 1996. 
21 Only the subset of events is included; these are considered in table 5 in the random effect probit 
estimation. The first reason is to force on the most important events, and to reduce a potential problem 
arising from that some events may occur simultaneously. In addition, the trigger events are treated as 
exogenous variables in the random effects probit.  Although existence of the endogeneity of trigger events 
is debatable, it is a reasonable assumption that the trigger events are exogenous in this exploratory analysis.      
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residual from the initial stage probit for labour force participation ( ,0 i LFP ),  i μ ~( 0 , 1 ) N  is an 
(iid) individual random effect which is not correlated with an individual’s initial observed labour 
force status,
22 and  , it ε is a (iid) error term having zero mean and known variance.  
5.1. Transition probit estimates 
Initially 3831 women and 10767 women are in the risk sets for labour force entry and 
withdrawal respectively. To proceed appropriately with the sample selection correction method, 
multiple labour force transitions are not modelled for the same individual. Each woman is 
followed until she makes her first labour force transition (either entry or withdrawal). About 70% 
of women provide more than three years of data: 1735 entries (859 from the first panel and 876 
from the second panel) and 2445 withdrawals (1234 from the first panel and 1211 from the 
second panel) are observed. The results from the initial stage probit are presented in table 6. 
Women participating in the labour force are more likely to be living with a spouse and are less 
likely to be living with pre-school children. The earnings of other family members are negatively 
correlated with the probability of labour force participation. In addition, there is no statistically 
significant difference in labour force participation between women from the first and second 
panels.
23
Tables 7 and 8 provide results from the random effects probits for labour force 
withdrawal and entry respectively.  The overall stories from estimates are consistent with table 4, 
which shows the probabilities of labour force transition conditional on trigger events. In table 7, 
women giving birth and experiencing an increase in pure family earnings are significantly more 
likely to withdraw from the labour force. Child birth has the greatest effect on the probability of 
                                                 
22 
i ν (the unobserved individual effects which is likely correlated with initial labour force state) in equation 
(4.1.1) is decomposed into two parts in the equation (4.1.2); 
,0 ˆ
i υ (the correction term) and 
i μ (the 
unobserved individual effects). 
23 Each panel contains six waves (one-year intervals for 6 years); therefore, the panels are not long enough 
to model business cycle effects.  
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labour force withdrawal. Table 8 reveals that women experiencing a separation, or a decrease in 
pure family earnings, are significantly more likely to enter the labour force. Separation has the 
largest effect on the probability of labour force entry. On the other hand, the events of being 
newly married (in table 7), and of ‘becoming free from the childcare of pre-school children’ (in 
table 8), do not have significant effects on women’s labour force withdrawal and labour force 
entry respectively. Sample selection correction is important in both labour force withdrawal and 
entry estimates. The coefficient on the generalized residual from the initial stage probit is 
statistically significant in both transition probits. On the importance of allowing for the individual 
random effect, the likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that 0 ρ =  is strongly rejected in the 
probit for labour force entry, but the likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that 0 ρ =  could 
not be rejected for labour force withdrawal. Thus the pooled labour force withdrawal probit 
estimates are reported in table 7. In the case of labour force withdrawal, it may be that the sample 
selection correction captures most of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Finally, there is no 
finding of significant difference between the panels with respect to labour force entry; however, 
there is a positive and significant coefficient on the panel dummy in the labour force withdrawal 
probit.  
6. Conclusions and discussion 
At the beginning of this paper it was argued that a panel perspective on the labour force 
transitions of women would provide a better understanding of women’s labour market 
participation. If women’s labour force participation rates remain constant over time, an 
explanation of their participation needs to relate their behaviour to labour force transition, 
because labour force participation is decomposed into labour force entry and withdrawal. Thus 
the primary determinants of those transitions could be different. This exploratory analysis 
specifically focuses on the association of women’s labour force transitions with particular trigger 
events that occur in their lives.  
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Regarding methods, the probability of labour force entry and withdrawal is estimated as 
being conditional on trigger events such as marriage, separation, childbirth, free from childcare, 
and changes in the earnings of other household members. There is an explicit investigation of 
whether the factors that determine (re-)entry into the labour force differ from the factors which 
determine withdrawal. Subsequently, a random effects transition probit model is estimated to 
examine labour force transitions within a multivariate setting.  
The results show that labour force transitions, not only entry but also withdrawal, occur 
more frequently among young women aged between 19 and 30. The event of childbirth is 
strongly associated with women’s labour force withdrawal, while the events of separation and 
decreases in family earnings are strongly associated with women’s labour force entry. Also, there 
are asymmetries in women’s labour force entries and withdrawals with respect to contrary events. 
For example, labour transitions are more sensitive to income-reducing events than to income-
supplementing events. In table 4, over 30% of women within the age groups 19 to 30 and 31 to 
40, who experience a decrease in family earnings, enter the labour force; less than 10% of women 
experiencing an increase in family earnings withdraw from the labour force. Why do we see such 
asymmetric effects of changes in family earnings on women’s labour force entry and withdrawal? 
Work affects a person’s utility in two ways. There is a direct effect derived from the activities and 
interactions associated with working itself. These direct effects can be positive, such as personal 
satisfaction from accomplishing important tasks, providing valued services, and social 
connections through work colleagues, or they can be negative, such as frustration, anxiety and 
stress associated with work. There is also an indirect (though often a primary) benefit from work:  
work provides income with which to purchase goods and services that increase a person’s utility. 
In other words, these are work incentives: self achievement and financial well-being. Since labour 
supply of women, as secondary earners, could be more flexible than that of a primary earner in 
the family, we may observe how those two work incentives play their roles in a process of 
women’s labour supply decisions. Here, we observe an asymmetric response of women’s labour 
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force withdrawal and entry with respect to increases and decreases in family income. The 
magnitude from an increase in family income is smaller than the magnitude from a decrease in 
family income.  Substantial increases in family income release a woman from her share of the 
family’s financial burden; however, one is still motivated to work by an incentive of self 
achievement because the value of her time for work is also high.  Women’s labour withdrawal, 
associated with family income increases, would be, therefore, less sensitive. Substantial decreases 
in the family’s income threaten the financial well-being of a family. Women’s labour force entry 
associated with income decreases would be more sensitive, even after taking into account the 
negative utility arising from working.  
Also, the probability of entry conditional on becoming separated is larger than the 
probability of labour force withdrawal conditional on getting married. Indeed, recent marriage is 
actually associated with a reduced probability of labour force withdrawal, while separation is 
associated with an increased probability of labour force entry in the age group 19 to 30. These 
results may partially reflect asymmetric behaviour when women are faced with the financial 
consequences of separation. However, the emotional and sociological effects of separation are 
also important factors in determining women’s labour force entry. The results show that the 
marginal effect of separation is larger than the marginal effect of pure income decreases on entry.  
From the policy point of view, support for women’s childbearing and caring is the most 
effective way to reduce women’s labour force withdrawals. Assisting women’s childbearing and 
caring, especially infants and young pre-school children, are important to prevent women from 
leaving the labour market. The study shows that child birth has the greatest effect on the 
probability of women’s labour force withdrawal, and women are less likely to (re-)enter the 
labour force after their children have grown up. This asymmetry could be more than a 
behavioural reason, but it could also be due to outdated labour skills years later. The latter factor 
may be the barrier for women returning to the labour force. Thus, the availability of retraining 
after the child-caring period would be also important in encouraging women to (re-)enter the 
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labour force. Childbearing (and subsequently child-caring) seems to be the single most important 
and persistent remaining issue for the continuity of women’s labour market attachment.
24 Last, an 
improvement in the accessibility of childcare would not only mean increasing the quantity of 
childcare but also improving its quality. Quality of childcare is also a major concern for mothers 
when they make a decision to withdraw from the labour market due to child-caring.
25   
This study is an exploratory analysis on the labour force transitions of women. These 
observed asymmetric labour supply behaviours of women are of interest, but the shortcoming is 
that these asymmetric behaviours could not be predicted by traditional labour supply models. 
Developing structural longitudinal labour supply models, in which asymmetric behaviour can be 
explained, would be good task for future research on women’s labour supply patterns. 
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Figure 1. Labour force participation rates of women by survey year
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TABLE 1. Women’s labour force shares and participation rates by age and demography 
Age category   Demographics  Population Share (%) LFP (%) Std. Err.
        
19-30 all  100.0 77.00 0.0034
 single  44.5 75.16 0.0052
 married    55.5 78.48 0.0044
  no pre-school children  60.8 82.64 0.0039
   pre-school children  39.2 68.25 0.0060
31-40 all  100.0 81.35 0.0025
 single  19.0 82.41 0.0056
 married    81.0 81.10 0.0028
  no pre-school children  65.1 84.19 0.0029
   pre-school children  34.9 76.06 0.0046
41-50 all  100.0 81.21 0.0026
 single  21.7 83.62 0.0053
 married    78.3 80.55 0.0030
  no pre-school children  96.6 81.45 0.0027
   pre-school children  3.4 74.57 0.0158
51-65 all  100.0 51.21 0.0037
 single  25.4 51.22 0.0074
 married    74.6 51.20 0.0043
  no pre-school children  99.9 51.21 0.0037
 pre-school  children  0.1 50.00 0.1336
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TABLE 2. Annual rates of labour force entry and withdrawal for women 
(pooled data - September)  
Age category  Entry rate Std. Err. Withdrawal rate  Std. Err.
All  0.1810 0.0029 0.0660 0.0011
19-30  0.3793 0.0092 0.0921 0.0031
31-40  0.2696 0.0072 0.0508 0.0017
41-50  0.1878 0.0067 0.0425 0.0016
51-65  0.0504 0.0026 0.1096 0.0034
The statistics are based on pooled data. Total number of women at risk of labour force entry is 5840 and total number of 
women at risk of labour force withdrawal is 12350 in September. 
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TABLE 3. Incidence of the trigger events by age group 
Withdrawal              
Age category   19-30  31-40  41-50  51-65 
  pr(event) Std. Err. pr(event) Std. Err. pr(event)  Std. Err.  pr(event) Std. Err.
Newly married    0.0602 0.0025 0.0168 0.0010 0.0093 0.0008 0.0061 0.0009
Newly having pre-school children  0.0536 0.0024 0.0189 0.0011 0.0015 0.0003 -- --
Child birth  0.0944 0.0031 0.0423 0.0016 0.0013 0.0003 -- --
Family earnings increased  0.2454 0.0046 0.2095 0.0032 0.2236 0.0034 0.1877 0.0043
Family total income increased  0.2246 0.0044 0.1908 0.0031 0.2170 0.0034 0.1868 0.0043
Family pure earnings increased  0.1623 0.0039 0.1538 0.0028 0.1365 0.0028 0.1263 0.0036
Family pure total income increased  0.1477 0.0038 0.1395 0.0027 0.1345 0.0028 0.1307 0.0037
              
              
Entry              
Age category   19-30  31-40  41-50  51-65 
  pr(event) Std. Err. pr(event) Std. Err. pr(event)  Std. Err.  pr(event) Std. Err.
Newly separated   0.0203 0.0027 0.0140 0.0019 0.0074 0.0015 0.0030 0.0006
Free from pre-school children  0.0278 0.0031 0.0806 0.0044 0.0197 0.0024 -- --
Family earnings decreased  0.1841 0.0073 0.1204 0.0052 0.1507 0.0061 0.1720 0.0045
Family total income decreased  0.1777 0.0072 0.1167 0.0052 0.1345 0.0059 0.1497 0.0042
Family pure earnings decreased  0.0766 0.0050 0.0741 0.0042 0.0736 0.0045 0.0822 0.0033
Family pure total income decreased  0.0773 0.0050 0.0770 0.0043 0.0642 0.0042 0.0813 0.0033
Note:  1. Labour force transitions and events each refer to changes between years t-1 and t.  
          2.  Numbers too small to be reported 
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TABLE 4. Labour force transitions conditional on trigger events, Pr(transition|event) 
Withdrawal          
Age category   19-30  31-40  41-50  51-65 
  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err. 
Pr (withdrawal)  0.0921 0.0031 0.0508 0.0017 0.0425 0.0016 0.1096 0.0034
Newly married   0.0690
* 0.0109 0.0593 0.0144 0.0360 0.0158 0.2157
* 0.0576
Newly having pre-school children  0.1929
* 0.0181 0.1053
* 0.0176 -- -- -- --
Child birth  0.2226
* 0.0144 0.0969
* 0.0113 -- -- -- --
Family earnings increased  0.0998 0.0064 0.0578
* 0.0040 0.0420 0.0035 0.0895
* 0.0072
Family total income increased  0.1031 0.0068 0.0560 0.0042 0.0409 0.0035 0.1112 0.0080
Family pure earnings increased  0.1052 0.0081 0.0574 0.0047 0.0484 0.0047 0.0884
* 0.0088
Family pure total income increased  0.1087
* 0.0086 0.0566 0.0049 0.0486 0.0048 0.1139 0.0096
          
Entry          
Age category   19-30  31-40  41-50  51-65 
  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err. 
Pr (entry)  0.3793 0.0092 0.2696 0.0072 0.1878 0.0067 0.0504 0.0026
Newly separated   0.3860 0.0645 0.4259
* 0.0673 0.2800 0.0898 -- --
Free from pre-school children  0.3974 0.0554 0.2774 0.0254 0.1791 0.0468 -- --
Family earnings decreased  0.4352
* 0.0218 0.3348
* 0.0219 0.2148 0.0182 0.0586 0.0067
Family total income decreased  0.4589
* 0.0223 0.3341
* 0.0223 0.2188 0.0193 0.0796
* 0.0083
Family pure earnings decreased  0.3442 0.0324 0.3474
* 0.0282 0.2280 0.0265 0.0570 0.0096
Family pure total income decreased  0.3502 0.0324 0.3311
* 0.0274 0.2156 0.0279 0.0785
* 0.0112
 
Note: 1. Labour force transitions and events each refer to changes between years t-1 and t.  
          2. Numbers too small to be reported. 
          3. I test the statistical significance of the differences between unconditional transition probability and transition probability conditional  
             each trigger event. (* Statistically significant at the 5% level.)




Withdrawal          
Age  category    19-30 31-40 41-50 51-65 
  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err. 
Newly married   0.0451 0.0072 0.0196 0.0048 0.0078 0.0035 0.0120 0.0036
Newly having pre-school children  0.1122 0.0110 0.0391 0.0068 -- -- -- --
Child birth  0.2280 0.0147 0.0807 0.0095 -- -- -- --
Family earnings increased  0.2659 0.0154 0.2384 0.0149 0.2214 0.0164 0.1533 0.0119
Family total income increased  0.2512 0.0151 0.2103 0.0142 0.2088 0.0161 0.1895 0.0130
Family pure earnings increased  0.1854 0.0136 0.1736 0.0132 0.1554 0.0144 0.1019 0.0100
Family pure total income increased  0.1744 0.0133 0.1553 0.0127 0.1538 0.0143 0.1358 0.0113
         
          
Entry          
Age  category    19-30 31-40 41-50 51-65 
  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err. 
Newly separated   0.0207 0.0044 0.0222 0.0046 0.0110 0.0041 -- --
Free from pre-school children  0.0291 0.0052 0.0829 0.0086 0.0188 0.0054 -- --
Family earnings decreased  0.2113 0.0125 0.1495 0.0111 0.1724 0.0150 0.2000 0.0212
Family total income decreased  0.2150 0.0126 0.1446 0.0109 0.1567 0.0144 0.2366 0.0226
Family pure earnings decreased  0.0695 0.0078 0.0955 0.0091 0.0893 0.0113 0.0930 0.0154
Family pure total income decreased  0.0714 0.0079 0.0945 0.0091 0.0737 0.0103 0.1268 0.0177
          
Note: 1. Labour force transitions and events each refer to changes between years t-1 and t.  
          2. Numbers too small to be reported 
TABLE 5. Trigger events conditional on labour transitions, pr (event |exit)    
TABLE 6. Initial stage probit results 
Variable Coef.  Std. 
Age 0.1173
***  0.0079 
Age squared  -0.0017
***  0.0001 
Living with spouse       0.1079
***  0.0311 
Living with kids  -0.5628
***  0.0324 
Family earnings   0.0000
***  0.0000 
Region-Atlantic -0.2364
***  0.0337 
Region-QUE -0.2291
***  0.0343 
Region-Prairies 0.0816
**  0.0354 
Region-BC           0.0374  0.0470 
Graduated high school  0.4297
***  0.0367 
Non-university postsecondary certificate  0.6240
***  0.0313 
University certificate or Bachelor’s degree  0.9434
***  0.0475 
More than Bachelor  1.1774
***  0.0847 
Full-time student  -0.5102
***  0.0382 
Panel 2          -0.0245  0.0237 
Constant -1.2479
***  0.1545 
N 14598   
Note:    
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 7. Pooled labour force withdrawal probit 
Variable Coef.  Std. 
Age -0.1305
***  0.0090 
Age squared   0.0017
***  0.0001 
Married            -0.0850  0.0750 
Childbirth   0.6804
***  0.0458 
Pure earnings increase    0.05998
**  0.0285 
Region-Atlantic   0.0824
***  0.0299 
Region-QUE             0.0249  0.0312 
Region-Prairies            -0.0552
*  0.0299 
Region-BC             0.0058  0.0384 
Graduated high school  -0.1280
***  0.0397 
Non-university postsecondary certificate  -0.2220
***  0.0379 
University certificate or Bachelor’s degree  -0.3163
***  0.0500 
More than Bachelor  -0.4240
***  0.0717 
Full-time student  0.4907
***  0.0325 
Panel 2  0.0612
***    0.0205 
Generalized residual   0.2410
***  0.0836 
Constant 0.6992
***  0.2138 
N 43371    
Note:    
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 




TABLE 8. The random effects labour force entry probit 
Variable Coef.  Std. 
Age 0.1004
***  0.0177 
Age squared  -0.0018
***  0.0002 
Separation 0.3603
**  0.1513 
Free from childcare            -0.0652  0.0877 
Pure earnings decrease  0.1220
*  0.0653 
Region-Atlantic            -0.1256
**  0.0573 
Region-QUE -0.1534
***  0.0586 
Region-Prairies             0.0869  0.0614 
Region-BC             0.0781  0.0820 
Graduated high school  0.2754
***  0.0691 
Non-university postsecondary certificate  0.6048
***  0.0696 
University certificate or Bachelor’s degree  0.9585
***  0.1071 
More than Bachelor  1.2956
***  0.1799 
Full-time student             0.0634  0.0627 
Panel 2             0.0423  0.0395 
Generalized residual  0.4592
***  0.1102 
Constant -1.8029
***  0.2863 
N 12904   
/lnsig2u -1.0835  0.1946 
sigma_u 0.5817  0.0566 
Ρ  0.2528  0.0368 
Note:      
1. Likelihood ratio test of ρ =0: chibar2(01) =    43.31, Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000 
2. * Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
    ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
    *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.    
Appendix  
TABLE A.1. Participation rate (%) of men and women by age 
   Women     Men   
year  age 25-34  age 35-44  age 45-54 age 25-34 age 35-44 age 45-54
1991  77.2 78.3 69.8 92.4 93.6 90.6
1992  76 77.5 70.7 91.3 92.6 89.8
1993  75.7 78.4 71.5 91.4 92.7 89.5
1994  75.6 78.2 71.1 91 92.6 89.7
1995  76.1 78.2 71.9 90.9 92.2 89.4
1996  77.1 78.4 71.5 91.2 91.9 88.8
1997  77.9 79.1 72.9 91.2 92.4 88.5
1998  78.6 79.3 74.2 91.9 92.4 88.4
1999  79.2 79.9 74.9 91.5 92.6 88.7
2000  79.7 80.2 75.5 91.6 92.4 88.9
 
TABLE A.2. Annual rates of labour force entry and withdrawal for women using March data  
 
(pooled data - March)  
Age category  Entry rate Std. Err. Withdrawal rate  Std. Err.
All  0.1799 0.0029 0.0656 0.0011
19-30  0.3638 0.0087 0.0990 0.0032
31-40  0.2550 0.0069 0.0511 0.0017
41-50  0.1824 0.0066 0.0410 0.0016
51-65  0.0520 0.0027 0.1018 0.0033
The statistics are based on pooled data. Total number of women at risk of labour force entry is 5907 and total number of 
women at risk of labour force withdrawal is 12296 in March. 
  33     
TABLE A.3.a Labour force withdrawal in extended time gap 
 
Age category   19-30  31-40  41-50  51-65 
   Rate   Std. Err. Rate   Std. Err. Rate   Std. Err. Rate   Std. Err.
Newly married                     
Pr(withdrawal at t |event)  0.0690 0.0109 0.0593 0.0144 0.0360  0.0158 0.2157 0.0576
Pr(withdrawal at t+1 |event)  0.1072 0.0145 0.0731 0.0176 --  -- 0.2162 0.0677
Newly having pre-school children                   
Pr(withdrawal at t|event)  0.1929 0.0181 0.1053 0.0176 --  -- -- --
Pr(withdrawal at t+1 |event)  0.2040 0.0201 0.1452 0.0227 --  -- -- --
Child birth                
Pr(withdrawal at t|event)  0.2226 0.0144 0.0969 0.0113 --  -- -- --
Pr(withdrawal at t+1 |event)  0.2205 0.0156 0.1423 0.0148 --  -- -- --
Family earnings increased              
Pr(withdrawal at t|event)  0.0998 0.0064 0.0578 0.0040 0.0420  0.0035 0.0895 0.0072
Pr(withdrawal at t+1 |event)  0.1231 0.0078 0.0732 0.0051 0.0590  0.0047 0.1480 0.0104
Family total income increased                        
Pr(withdrawal at t|event)  0.1031 0.0068 0.0560 0.0042 0.0409  0.0035 0.1112 0.0080
Pr(withdrawal at t+1 |event)  0.1310 0.0084 0.0721 0.0053 0.0601  0.0048 0.1767 0.0113
Family pure earnings increased                        
Pr(withdrawal at t|event)  0.1052 0.0081 0.0574 0.0047 0.0484  0.0047 0.0884 0.0088
Pr(withdrawal at t+1 |event)  0.1236 0.0096 0.0705 0.0058 0.0592  0.0060 0.1509 0.0128
Family pure total income increased                        
Pr(withdrawal at t|event)  0.1087 0.0086 0.0566 0.0049 0.0486  0.0048 0.1139 0.0096
Pr(withdrawal at t+1 |event)  0.1306 0.0103 0.0694 0.0061 0.0611  0.0061 0.1849 0.0137
 
Note: Numbers too small to be reported. 
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TABLE A.3.b Labour force entry in extended time gap 
 
Age category   19-30  31-40  41-50  51-65 
   Rate   Std. Err. Rate   Std. Err. Rate   Std. Err.  Rate   Std. Err. 
Newly separated                 
Pr(entry at t |event)  0.3860  0.0645 0.4259 0.0673 0.2800 0.0898 -- --
Pr(entry at t+1 |event)  0.4286  0.0707 0.4651 0.0761 -- -- -- --
Free from pre-school children           
Pr(entry at t |event)  0.3974  0.0554 0.2774 0.0254 0.1791 0.0468 -- --
Pr(entry at t+1 |event)  0.5625  0.0620 0.3800 0.0307 0.2909 0.0612 -- --
Family earnings decreased              
Pr(entry at t |event)  0.4352  0.0218 0.3348 0.0219 0.2148 0.0182 0.0586 0.0067
Pr(entry at t+1 |event)  0.5817  0.0233 0.4297 0.0257 0.2864 0.0229 0.0744 0.0087
Family total income decreased                  
Pr(entry at t |event)  0.4589  0.0223 0.3341 0.0223 0.2188 0.0193 0.0796 0.0083
Pr(entry at t+1 |event)  0.5747  0.0237 0.4132 0.0258 0.2801 0.0238 0.0895 0.0101
Family pure earnings decreased               
Pr(entry at t |event)  0.3442  0.0324 0.3474 0.0282 0.2280 0.0265 0.0570 0.0096
Pr(entry at t+1 |event)  0.4751  0.0371 0.4626 0.0331 0.3122 0.0337 0.0584 0.0113
Family pure total income decreased               
Pr(entry at t |event)  0.3502  0.0324 0.3311 0.0274 0.2156 0.0279 0.0785 0.0112
Pr(entry at t+1 |event)  0.4660  0.0361 0.4298 0.0318 0.2934 0.0352 0.0808 0.0131
 
Note: Numbers too small to be reported 
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